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CHOICE OF LAW AND USURY LIMITS UNDER TEXAS LAW
AND THE NATIONAL BANK ACT
by
Fred C Pedersen* and John C Cox**
R ELATIVELY high interest rates,' combined with the limited interest
rate ceilings existing in many states, have severely restricted the avail-
able money supply and have caused sophisticated borrowers and lenders
to search for every conceivable avenue to make funds available at profita-
ble yet legal interest rates. Because of the sometimes draconian penalties
imposed upon lenders for charging usurious interest,2 all transactions in-
volving charges for the use, detention, or forbearance of funds must be
scrutinized by lenders and their counsel with great care. Methods of
avoiding adverse usury laws vary. The most common procedure for in-
creasing the effective yield on a loan without raising the interest rate in-
volves the addition of sundry charges, such as commitment fees. A
considerable amount of discussion exists concerning the "interest" aspect
of such charges,3 and most jurisdictions have clearly defined the limits of
this approach. Another approach is simply to move a transaction to a ju-
risdiction having permissive interest ceilings 4 or, in the case of corporate
* B.A., State University of New York College at Oswego; J.D., University of Toledo;
LL.M., Columbia University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. This Article was conceived in the winter of 1980, during a period of dramatically
rising interest rates.
2. In New York, for example, usurious obligations are declared void by statute. N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 1978). Borrowers may recover twice the interest they
have paid under usurious obligations, and criminal penalties are available. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 60.05(4) (McKinney 1978). In Texas any person contracting for or receiving interest
in excess of the legal limit forfeits to the obligor three times the amount of interest so con-
tracted for or received (plus reasonable attorneys' fees) "except that in no event shall the
amount forfeited be less than Two Thousand Dollars or twenty percent of the principal,
whichever is the smaller sum." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1971-1979).
3. See, e.g., Danforth, Usury: Applicability to Collateral Fees and Changes, 16 S.D.L.
REV. 52 (1971); Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial Lending, 49 TEXAS L. REV.
419 (1971); Schrader, The Wrap-Around Mortgage. A Critical Inquiry, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1529 (1974); Sintenis, Current Treatment of the Non-Refundable Commitment Fee and Related
Problems, 86 BANKING L.J. 590 (1969); Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest
and Interest in Advance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748 (1975); Note, Indexed Principal:. A Way Around the
Usury Laws?, 31 ARK. L. REV. 141 (1977); Note, Late Changes in Deeds of Trust as Usury,
30 BAYLOR L. REV. 174 (1978). Numerous annotations also analyze this issue. See, e.g.,
Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 769 (1979); Annot.; 91 A.L.R.2d 1344 (1963); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 288
(1951).
In addition to changing the form of the lender's compensation, the parties may alter the
legal status of the borrower to render applicable different interest rate maximums. See, e.g.,
Note, Incorporation to Avoid the Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1968).
4. The provisions of state usury laws vary greatly. Some states, such as Arkansas and
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borrowers, to a jurisdiction that prohibits assertion of the usury defense by
corporations.5 Because moving a transaction to another jurisdiction fre-
quently is physically impossible or impractical, lenders have in some in-
stances either incorporated choice of law provisions in loan documentation
or structured contracts so that the usury laws of a state or jurisdiction other
than the jurisdiction of the borrowers' or lenders' domicile would apply to
their transactions. In some situations, these parties have sought to apply
the law of a jurisdiction that has, at best, a marginal connection with the
transaction or the parties. To bolster the argument that the choice of gov-
erning law should be enforced, these parties frequently have attempted to
arrange as many contacts as possible between the transaction and the juris-
diction whose law they select. The success of such a strategy is ordinarily a
function of the choice of law principles of the jurisdiction in which litiga-
tion concerning the transaction arises.
Situations that necessitate a choice of law decision include those in
which interstate finance companies solicit mail-order customers through
national media, and credit card issuers issue credit cards to persons in
states having varying interest rate maximums. One commentator has re-
ported, for example, that a Kentucky corporation in the business of mak-
ing interstate loans had loans of $3,500,000 outstanding to California
residents alone and was increasing this amount by some $90,000 per
week.6 In such situations, the lender or credit card issuer must carefully
evaluate the choice of law principles in each jurisdiction in which credit is
extended, lest even an express choice of governing law by the parties be
disallowed.
Choice of law questions also arise in contexts other than those in which
the parties expressly choose the governing law or intentionally structure a
Tennessee, have a single maximum rate of interest that may be charged by all lenders to all
borrowers. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. !1, § 7. Other states, notably
Texas, have usury legislation that provides different interest rate maximums or usury ex-
emptions for different types of borrowers or different classes of loans. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-3.01 (Vernon 1971). As might be expected, the method of calculating inter-
est charged in a particular situation varies from state to state, as do penalties for charging
excessive interest. Overlying all of these state laws is the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 21-215b (1976), which provides the method for calculation of the applicable interest rate
maximum for national banks. Id. § 85. Finally, international transactions may involve the
provisions of a foreign usury law when a loan is made through a foreign branch of a United
States bank or to a foreign borrower.
5. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.2 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7105 (1975);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 438.31 (1979). Such laws are also found in Illinois, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma, among other states.
The rule that corporate borrowers may not assert the usury defense is apparently derived
from the early case of New York Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N.Y.
344 (1850). In that case, a New York bank had obtained a loan from a British lender. The
State of New York imposed an interest rate ceiling of 6%, but the loan in question provided
for an interest rate of 11%. In litigation concerning the loan, the court, applying New York
law, upheld the usury defense set up by the borrowing bank and directed the forfeiture of
the entire principal and interest. The decision caused considerable public outcry, and
shortly thereafter New York enacted a statute denying to corporations the defense of usury.
6. See Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of Lex Debitoris, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 123, 124 (1967).
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transaction to avoid the usury laws of a particular jurisdiction. Many large
lending transactions, corporate bond offerings, 7 and similar transactions
involving interest, and thus potential usury questions, have contacts with
and involve persons in numerous jurisdictions. Moreover, many loans are
syndicated, with participating lenders located in several jurisdictions. In
syndicated loan transactions, many difficult questions arise. Among these
are whether all lenders participating in such a transaction should be per-
mitted to charge interest at the same rate and, if so, which of the partici-
pant's local interest rates should apply. When all participants may charge
interest at the rate permitted to them by a managing or lead bank, another
question is whether an exception should be made in situations in which the
lead bank is chosen solely for the liberal interest rate maximum available
in its jurisdiction.
In each of the above contexts, a determination must be made concerning
(i) whether more than one jurisdiction's interest rate ceiling potentially ap-
plies to the transaction; if so, (ii) which of these jurisdictions' interest rate
ceilings is the most favorable; and (iii) whether that jurisdiction's law may
be applied merely on the basis of a choice of law provision in one or more
documents evidencing the transaction, or whether its law may be rendered
applicable through creative structuring of the transaction.
If the interest rate limitations of one jurisdiction are deemed to be par-
ticularly advantageous in a given transaction, still other issues must be ad-
dressed. For example, while one jurisdiction's usury laws may be
favorable to the lender, other laws of that jurisdiction may have an unfa-
vorable impact upon one of the parties or the transaction as a whole. In
such a situation, the parties might seek to apply the laws of more than one
jurisdiction to a single transaction. Thus, a contract might state that one
jurisdiction's law governs with respect to usury issues arising from the
transaction while the laws of another jurisdiction govern interpretation,
construction, enforceability, and other aspects of the contractual relation-
ship. Contractual choices of more than one law raise serious questions,
however, particularly when the parties choose one jurisdiction's law only
for purposes of controlling interest rate maximums. Because these ques-
tions involve a collateral issue of choice of law, and because Texas author-
ity in this area appears to be completely lacking, this Article does not
discuss the ramifications of choosing more than one law.8
Additional and perhaps unforeseen problems may be encountered when
one or more of the lenders is a national bank. Federal laws governing
national banks do not provide clear guidelines as to the interest rate maxi-
7. In addition to other types of interest, offerings of debentures also frequently involve
original issue discount. See, e.g., United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965).
8. The parties to a transaction may choose not merely a single "governing law," but
also may make specific provision regarding the law to govern certain issues such as contrac-
tual formalities, modes of performance, and perfection or validity of security arrangements.
See Reese, Dpeqage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58
(1973). The term "d~peqage" is used to refer to the process of applying different rules to
different issues arising within a single contract or transaction. See also Cavers, Contempo-
rary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 3 RECUEIL DES COURS 137 (1970).
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mum that may be applicable to loans made by a national bank.9 In nu-
merous transactions having multijurisdictional aspects, many national
banks are currently seeking, through an express choice of governing law,
to apply another jurisdiction's laws to govern interest rate maximums
when little or no authority exists to support that position. In fact, statutory
authority exists that could be interpreted to prohibit such activity.l°
This Article examines the enforceability of an express contractual choice
of governing law"I by considering the approach of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws12 and the choice of law principles of the Uniform
Commercial Code 13 and by focusing upon the general rules enunciated in
principal Texas decisions. For purposes of this analysis, no distinction will
be made between situations in which a single jurisdiction's law is chosen to
govern all aspects of a transaction and those in which the laws of more
than one jurisdiction are chosen, each to govern distinct issues. In addi-
tion, this Article analyzes the approaches taken by the Restatement and
Texas courts when the issue of enforceability of an express contractual
choice of governing law arises in the special context of a usury challenge.
Finally, this Article considers the position of United States national
banks 14 vis-a-vis state interest rate ceilings. The authors advocate a liberal
9. See notes 131-37 infra and accompanying text.
10. "Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount
made ... interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where
the bank is located ...... 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
11. Choice of law clauses raise numerous issues aside from their effectiveness or ineffec-
tiveness. For example, a selection of governing law includes only the substantive law of the
chosen jurisdiction. The law of the forum governs issues that may be characterized as "pro-
cedural" and, according to the weight of authority, also determines the characterization of
an issue as substantive or procedural. See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387
(5th Cir. 1955); Dailey v. Transitron Overseas Corp., 349 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd
sub nom. Dailey v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 475 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Sedler, The
Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 813 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122-143 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. In addition, a choice of law clause is generally con-
strued as selecting the governing law as it exists from time to time, not as fixing this law as of
the date of the contract. But see American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. General Outdoor Adv.
Co., 18 I11. App. 2d 602, 153 N.E.2d 110 (1958); Compania De Inversiones Internacionales v.
Industrial Mortgage Bank, 269 N.Y. 22, 198 N.E. 617 (1935). Moreover, a choice of gov-
erning law is ordinarily deemed to incorporate only the local law of the jurisdiction whose
law is selected rather than its whole law including its choice of law principles. See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 11, § 186, Comment b; id. § 187(3), Comment h. See also Siegelman
v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955); Reger v. National Ass'n of Bedding
Mfrs. Group Ins. Trust Fund, 83 Misc. 2d 527, 372 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Sharwood,
Renvoi and Contractual Choice of Law, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 120 (1956). But see A. VON
MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 522-30 (1965).
Attorneys drafting choice of law clauses should also give careful consideration to the
scope of the choice of law provision in question. In In re Caver, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 869 (D. Me.
1969), a choice of law clause referred to another jurisdiction's law for purposes of governing
the "validity and construction" of a note. The court held, in a suit on the note, that the law
of the forum nonetheless governed the issues of enforceability and that therefore the transac-
tion in question was usurious.
12. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11.
13. U.C.C. § 1-105.
14. United States national banks are banking associations created pursuant to and gov-
erned by the National Bank Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-215b (1976).
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interpretation of the National Bank Act, 15 which would permit national
banks choosing the maximum rate of interest they may charge to use the
same choice of law analysis available to state chartered lenders. Such an
approach, in the view of the authors, would best effectuate the raison d',tre
of the National Bank Act: the promotion of a truly national banking sys-
tem. 16
I. CHOICE OF LAW AND USURY
A. General Rules Regarding Express Choice of Law
In the United States, the general rule applied to an express choice of law
made for the purpose of controlling issues such as the validity, enforceabil-
ity, interpretation, and construction of a contract is that such a choice of
law will be enforced 17 if the contract in question and the transaction of
which it is a part bear a "reasonable relationship" to the jurisdiction whose
law is chosen. 18
Restatement Rule. The rule of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws 19 accords with rules operative in most jurisdictions. The Restate-
ment provides that a contractual choice of law will be enforced unless (i)
the chosen jurisdiction has no substantial relationship to the parties or the
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(ii) application of the law chosen would be contrary to a fundamental pol-
icy of a jurisdiction that has a materially greater interest than the jurisdic-
tion whose law is chosen in the determination of the particular issue. The
latter jurisdiction would be the jurisdiction of applicable law under the
Restatement 20 in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 2'
Thus, according to the Restatement, in a two-party lending transaction in
which the borrower is located in Texas, the lender is located in New York,
the transaction is negotiated in both states, and other aspects of the trans-
15. Id.
16. See generally S. REP. No. 730, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in [1959] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2232.
17. Exception will be made, however, if public policy would be contravened thereby.
See notes 118-26 infra and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 203-07 (4th ed. E.
Scoles 1964); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 269-75 (1971);
Levin, Party Autonomy. Choice-of-Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEO. L.J. 260
(1958). For a treatment of express stipulations of applicable law in international transac-
tions, see G. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT FINANCING 74-91 (1967).
19. Although the Restatement is widely considered persuasive authority, many of the
contracts portions of the Restatement have not been adopted as Texas law. In view of the
recent Texas Supreme Court decision in Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex.
1979), however, in which the court rejected common law choice of law principles and
adopted the most significant relationship test of the Restatement for "all conflicts cases
sounding in tort," id. at 318, Texas courts may also adopt Restatement rules applicable to
contract actions. See generally Comment, Abandonment of Lex Loci Delicti in Texas The
Adoption ofthe Most Significant Relationship Test, 33 Sw. L.J. 1221 (1980).
20. See RESTATEMENT, supra note I1, § 187.
21. Id. § 188.
19801
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action are disbursed between the states, the parties may in the ordinary
case safely choose to apply the law of either Texas or New York to their
transaction. The most frequently cited rationale for this rule is that it best
protects the expectations of the parties; hence the rule that a choice of law
that renders a contract invalid will ordinarily not be enforced. 22
In many respects, a choice of governing law is little more than a short-
hand incorporation of a jurisdiction's substantive law into a contract.
While the parties to a contract might prefer to delineate in the contract
many of the rules that they deem applicable to their agreement, they can
accomplish much the same goal through an express choice of governing
law. 2
3
Whenever parties wish to make an express choice of law to govern their
transaction, the question arises as to what constitutes the requisite substan-
tial or reasonable relationship between the transaction and the jurisdiction
whose law they select. Although the Restatement sets forth no dispositive
criteria on the basis of which to determine the existence of a substantial
relationship in the context of a contractual choice of law, the contacts
deemed relevant by the Restatement as a basis for selecting a governing
law in the absence of an express choice of law include (i) the place of
contracting, (ii) the place of negotiation of the contract, (iii) the place of
performance, (iv) the location of the contract's subject matter, and (v) the
domicile, residence, nationality, and place of business of the parties.24 In-
sofar as these factors are set forth in the Restatement as a means to deter-
mine those jurisdictions that "are most likely to be interested" in a
transaction, 25 one might reasonably conclude that such factors may also
serve to establish a substantial relationship to validate an express choice of
law. The comments to Restatement section 187 note that a substantial rela-
tionship to the parties or the contract exists when the chosen jurisdiction is
"that where performance by one of the parties is to take place or where one
of the parties is domiciled or has his principal place of business" 26 or "the
place of contracting except, perhaps, in the unusual situation where this
place is wholly fortuitous and bears no real relation either to the contract
or to the parties. ' 27 Thus if the choice of law does not contravene a funda-
22. Id. § 187, Comment e.
23. The effectiveness and enforceability of an express choice of law are issues distinct
from an ex post facto judicial determination of governing law, which may be made through
(1) an interest analysis, see, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, II Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666,
114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974); Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr.
266 (1961); (2) a "center of gravity" or grouping of contacts approach, see, e.g., Auten v.
Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); (3) or other analysis that may be made in the
absence of an express choice of law or in the event that an express choice of law is held to be
ineffective. In some jurisdictions courts have held that an express choice of governing law is
but one of the contacts to be considered in making a determination as to governing law.
See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961). Yet cases
involving no express choice of governing law are of some value in analyzing the position of a
jurisdiction with respect to applicable law in general.
24. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 188(2).
25. Id. Comment e.




mental policy of a materially more interested jurisdiction, the Restatement
generally affords to contracting parties a considerable measure of auton-
omy in selecting governing law when relatively minimal contacts with the
chosen jurisdiction exist.28
Uniform Commercial Code Rule.29 Under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), when a transaction bears a "reasonable relationship" to two states,
the parties may agree that either state's law shall govern with respect to
their "rights and duties."' 30 Concerning the required reasonable relation-
ship, the UCC notes that "[oirdinarily the law chosen must be that of a
jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the making or perform-
ance of the contract is to occur or occurs," 3 1 but that a choice of law may
"sometimes take effect as a shorthand expression of the intent of the par-
ties as to matters governed by their agreement, even though the transaction
has no significant contact with the jurisdiction chosen."' 32 Although the
UCC does not clarify what constitutes a "significant enough" portion of
the making or performance of a contract, the rule would appear to afford
contracting parties considerable latitude in choosing governing law, and,
in practice, an express choice of law under the UCC is seldom disre-
garded. 33
28. In addition, judicial precedent exists for the proposition that a substantial relation-
ship could be found even in the absence of any physical contacts between the transaction
and the jurisdiction whose law is chosen. In Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp.,
167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948), the court examined a situation in
which the laws of Pennsylvania had been chosen to govern a contract made in another state
between nonresidents of Pennsylvania. While finding a relationship between the contract
and the state of Pennsylvania on the basis of limited activities in and over Pennsylvania, the
court noted: "There seems no ...justification for precluding parties to a contract from
stipulating that the laws of any jurisdiction, even if foreign to the elements of the contract,
should govern the rights and obligations of the parties, where not against public policy
... " 167 F.2d at 730. See also Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C.
277.
29. U.C.C. § 1-105(2) lists a few exceptions to the general rule. Id. §§ 2-402, 4-102, 6-
102, 8-106, 9-102 & 9-103.
30. Id. § 1-105(1). For the history of this section, see Braucher, The Legislative History
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 810-12 (1958). See also Note,
Conflict of Laws and the Appropriate Relation Test of Section 1-105 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 797 (1972).
U.C.C. § 1-105(1) expressly refers only to the selection of a system of law to govern the
"rights and duties" of the parties to a contract. The UCC does not clarify whether parties to
a contract controlled by the UCC may select a law to govern matters of contractual validity.
On the issue of whether a choice of law clause controls questions of contractual validity, see
R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 18, at 270-75. See also Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882);
Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961); Nordstrom, Choice of
Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 364 (1963); Tuchler, Boundaries to
Party Autonomy in the Unform Commercial Code.- A Radical View, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 180
(1967). For an application of§ 1-105(1), see Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Pratt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct.
537, 278 A.2d 154 (1971); Jim v. CIT Fin. Serv. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
31. U.C.C. § 1-105, Comment 1.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Three-Seventy Leasing Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 528 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.
1976); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Baker v. Gotz, 387 F. Supp. 1381 (D. Del.), aff'd, 523 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1975); Windsor
Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1972): Mell
v. Goodbody & Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 809, 295 N.E.2d 97 (1973). But see Woco v. Benjamin
Franklin Corp., 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1015 (D.N.H. 1976).
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Common Law Rules. Delineating the precise rule applied by courts in each
jurisdiction in assessing the enforceability of an express choice of gov-
erning law is beyond the scope of this Article. A few jurisdictions have
expressly adopted the Restatement rule,34 and a great majority follow the
general UCC rule. The general reasonable relationship rule set forth
above is in fact representative of the vast weight of modern judicial au-
thority. 35
Texas Choice of Law Rules. In Texas, though few judicial decisions have
considered the enforceability of an express choice of law, 3 6 modern au-
34. See, e.g., Scientific Holding Co. v. Plessey, Inc., 510 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1974); South-
ern Int'l Sales Co. v. Potter & Brumfield Div., 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
35. See, e.g., Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota
substantive law under Alabama choice of law principles); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441 F.2d
150 (5th Cir.) (applying Texas law), rev'd and remanded, 446 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1971); Tele-
Controls, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967) (applying Oregon substantive
law to determine if Illinois' reversibility standard met); Massengale v. Transitron Elec.
Corp., 385 F.2d 83 (lst Cir. 1967) (applying Massachusetts law); National Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. D&L Constr. Co., 353 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1965) (under Missouri law, refusing to
enforce express choice of California law because of lack of logical basis upon which to do
so), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Consolidated Jewelers, Inc. v. Standard Fin. Corp., 325
F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1963) (applying New York substantive law under Kentucky choice of law
principles); MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Imperial Glass Co., 65 F.R.D. 624 (D. Nev. 1974)
(refusing application of California substantive law on the basis of lack of contacts with Cali-
fornia and Nevada public policy), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 887 (1976); Michael v. SS Thanasis, 311 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(dictum, applying California law); B.M. Heede, Inc. v. West India Mach. & Supply Co., 272
F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (applying New York law); Parks v. Baldwin Piano & Organ
Co., 262 F. Supp. 515 (D. Conn.) (applying Ohio substantive law under Connecticut choice
of law principles), af'd, 386 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1967).
36. Historically, Texas decisions have sought to carry out the parties' intent in applying
the law of a particular jurisdiction. If the intention of the parties cannot be discerned from
the contract or transaction, courts in Texas have applied the law of the place of contracting
or the law of the jurisdiction in which the parties intended their contract to be performed if
the place of performance was other than the place of contracting on the theory that the law
of the place of performance was intended to govern. See, e.g., Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra,
464 F. Supp. 1209 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Harris, 94 Tex. 25, 57 S.W.
635 (1900); Seiders v. Merchants' Life Ass'n, 93 Tex. 194, 54 S.W. 753 (1900); W.A. Ryan &
Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 65 Tex. 13 (1885); Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255
S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ refd n.r.e.); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Parsley, 121 S.W. 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ dism'd); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Garrett,
102 S.W. 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, 80 S.W.
561 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, writ refd); Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 61 S.W. 501 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1901, writ refd); Mexican Nat'l R.R. v. Ware, 60 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900,
writ dism'd). In none of the above decisions, however, was the analysis of the courts very
thorough and none involved an express choice of governing law. See also Beale, "hat Law
Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1909).
In several early Texas cases not involving usury, an express choice of governing law was
approved, albeit without discussion. The earliest of these cases, Mullen v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 89 Tex. 259, 34 S.W. 605 (1896), involved an insurance policy issued by a New York
insurer to two Texas residents. The application for insurance contained a provision that it
was "subject to ... the laws of New York." One of the insured died but the insurer refused
to pay under the policy because the insured had failed to pay two premiums due prior to her
death. Under Texas law, the defense of the insurer apparently would have prevailed. New
York law provided that such an insurance policy could be cancelled only after written notice
to the insured. Such notice had not been given. In a suit by the beneficiary against the
insurer, the Texas Supreme Court held that "the provisions of the New York statute, under
the facts shown in this case, entered into and became a part of the contract between the
parties." Id. at 261, 34 S.W. at 606. The court reviewed the decisions of the New York
[Vol. 34
CHOICE OF LAW AND USURY
thority focuses upon the nature and extent of the contacts between the
transaction and the jurisdiction whose law is selected. A choice of gov-
erning law will be enforced by Texas courts if the jurisdiction whose law is
chosen is reasonably related to the contract and the transaction. For ex-
ample, in Dowling v. NADWMarketing, Inc.,37 NADW Marketing, a Lou-
isiana corporation that was registered to do business in Texas, entered into
a contract with Dowling, a Texas resident. In a section entitled "Contract
Interpretation," the contract provided that the contract "shall be inter-
preted and construed under the laws of the State of Louisiana. ' 38 Dowling
thereafter brought suit against NADW and contended that Texas law
should be applicable. The court of civil appeals rejected Dowling's con-
tention and simply held that "Texas courts have long recognized that par-
ties to a contract, under certain circumstances, may choose the law
applicable to the transaction in which they are engaging. ' 39 In Teas v.
Kimball,40 perhaps the most frequently cited Texas authority concerning
the enforceability of an express choice of law, the court held: "If the par-
ties specify in the contract that the contract is to be governed by the law of
a particular place, that law will govern if it has a reasonable relationship to
the contract."' 4 1 Numerous other judicial decisions in Texas affirm this
rule although none expressly analyzes the elements of the required reason-
able relationship.42
In summary, under the Restatement and the UCC as well as Texas com-
mon law, the modern judicial trend apparently is to give controlling effect
to a contractual choice of law, at least when the jurisdiction whose law is
chosen is reasonably related to the contract and transaction.4 3
courts construing the statute in question and held that in the absence of the requisite notice
to the insured, the beneficiary would be entitled to recover under the policy. See also New
York Life Ins. Co. v. English, 95 Tex. 391, 67 S.W. 884 (1902); Washington Life Ins. Co. v.
Berwald, 72 S.W. 436 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 97 Tex. 111, 76 S.W. 442 (1903); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Orlopp, 61 S.W. 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ refd); Germania Life Ins.
Co. v. Peetz, 47 S.W. 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ ref'd). In the absence of such a stipula-
tion of governing law, Texas courts considering almost the same factual circumstances and
the same New York statute have analyzed the issue of governing law in terms of the place of
contracting and/or the place of intended performance. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Bradley, 98 Tex. 230, 231-32, 82 S.W. 1031, 1032 (1904).
37. 578 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 476. See also Austin Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d
697 (Tex. 1968), a case not involving an express choice of law, wherein the Texas Supreme
Court held that "[t]he effect of a contract is to be determined by the law intended by the
parties to control, and in the absence of a contrary manifestation, the presumption is that the
parties contract with reference to where the contract was made." Id. at 701. Accord, Dailey
v. Transitron Overseas Corp., 349 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'dsub nom. Dailey v.
Transitron Elec. Corp., 475 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1973); Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Cody,
458 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ).
40. 257 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1958).
41. Id. at 823.
42. See notes 36 & 39 supra.
43. See also R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 147 (3d ed. 1977) and authori-
ties cited therein.
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B. Usury and Express Choice of Law
On the basis of the general reasonable relationship rule, contracting par-
ties may select for themselves many of the legal rules that will govern their
transaction for purposes of determining its validity or enforceability, or for
purposes of interpretation or construction of their contract. With respect
to other contractual matters, however, the parties may not enjoy the same
degree of latitude. Certain issues lie beyond the contractual capacity of
either natural or juristic persons, 44 and all states have mandatory rules that
may not be avoided through the simple device of a choice of foreign law.
If, for example, persons were permitted in all cases to select the interest
rate maximum applicable to their transactions, lenders could easily cir-
cumvent usury laws to the detriment of necessitous borrowers, and usury
laws could be rendered nullities. A state might then be placed in the
anomalous position of enforcing a contract violative of its own usury laws,
though the only connection between the contract and the chosen law is the
single fact that the parties selected such governing law. Accordingly, in
certain situations courts have refused to recognize an express choice of
governing law as determinative of the applicable interest rate maximum
with respect to a particular transaction. This refusal has been based on a
number of theories, but two are of primary importance: (i) that the gov-
erning law was selected in an attempt by the lender4 5 to evade the usury
limits imposed by the law of the borrower's jurisdiction;46 and (ii) that the
enforcement of such a choice of law would violate the public policy of the
forum.4 7
44. A simple example might involve a minor who, under the laws of his domicile, lacks
capacity to contract. Clearly, that person cannot vest himself with capacity to contract
through the simple expedient of a specification in his agreement that the law of another
jurisdiction will govern the contract. Similarly, contracting parties may not avoid their dom-
icile's formal contractual requirements, such as a written agreement or payment of consider-
ation, merely by choosing the law of a jurisdiction having no such requirement to govern a
transaction. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 187, Comment d.
45. One author has suggested that "courts are concerned only with the lender's, and not
the borrower's intent." Comment, supra note 6, at 162 n.243. One might wonder whether a
court should also be concerned with the borrower's intent, particularly when the borrower is
an issuer of corporate bonds or debentures.
46. See, e.g., Dupree v. Virgil R. Coss Mortgage Co., 167 Ark. 18, 267 S.W. 586 (1924).
See also Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., 364 S.W.2d 158 (Ark. 1963); Dairy Equip.
Co. v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 301,442 P.2d 437 (1968); Zimmerman v. Brown, 30 Idaho 640, 166
P. 924 (1917); Cobe v. Guyer, 237 I11. 568, 86 N.E. 1088 (1908); Majestic Loan Co. v. Ed-
monson, 172 Okla. 222, 45 P.2d 504 (1935); Note, Fraud on the La--The Doctrine of Eva-
sion, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1020 (1942). Whether the lender has attempted to evade the
law of a particular jurisdiction has been analyzed in some decisions in terms of the subjec-
tive intention of the lender and in other decisions as a function of the requirement that the
contract or transaction bear a "normal and natural" relationship to the jurisdiction whose
law is chosen. See Comment, supra note 6, at 162-70. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 11,
§ 203, Comment c, has adopted the latter approach.
47. See, e.g., Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931); Stod-
dard v. Thomas, 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 177 (1915). See also Trinidad Indus. Bank v. Romero, 81
N.M. 291, 466 P.2d 568 (1970); Bowman v. Price, 143 Tenn. 366, 226 S.W. 210 (1920). In
addition to the exceptions set forth in the text, certain other obvious exceptions to the rule of
party autonomy exist. For example, a choice of law that is induced by improper means such
as fraud or overreaching will not be enforced. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 187,
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Restatement Rule. The Restatement, like the courts, appears to take a
stricter approach to the enforceability of an express choice of governing
law in the specific context of usury. Restatement section 203 provides:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury
if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to
which the contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in
excess of the rate permitted by the general usury law of the state of the
otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 188 [the general Restate-
ment rule of most significant relationship] .48
Thus, the Restatement requires that the jurisdiction whose law is chosen
bear a substantial relationship to the contract. Moreover, the rate of inter-
est charged must not greatly exceed the permissible rate of the state most
significantly affected by or related to the transaction. The Restatement fur-
ther provides: "The parties will not be permitted, by means of a choice-of-
law provision, to obtain still more favorable treatment [than is available
under Restatement section 203] for the contract by application of the local
law of a state which has no substantial relationship to the contract. ' '49 The
key to application of the Restatement rule, therefore, is the existence of a
substantial relationship with the jurisdiction whose law is chosen. Com-
ment c to section 203 describes this relationship:
To have a substantial relationship to a contract as to a particular is-
sue, a state must have a normal and natural relationship to the con-
tract and the parties. The required relationship is unlikely to be based
solely upon contacts purposely located in the state by the parties in an
attempt to gain the benefit of that state's usury statute . . .50
Whether the requirement of a substantial relationship in this section is in
fact an alteration of the ordinary Restatement choice of law standard is
uncertain, however, in view of the fact that the Restatement5' requires a
substantial relationship to validate any express choice of law. Yet the Re-
statement analysis of substantial relationships appears to be only a re-
phrasing of the reasonable relationship analysis found in many decisions.
Moreover, the "fundamental policy" referred to in Restatement section
18752 as a basis for invalidating an express choice of governing law outside
the usury context is present in section 203 because of the requirement that
the rate of interest charged may not greatly exceed the rate permitted by
the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the transaction.
Nevertheless, insofar as Restatement section 203 appears to disregard cer-
tain purposefully arranged contacts, it probably states a rule stricter than
that embodied by section 187 and more in line with judicial decisions that
Comment b. See also Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). A
choice of law will not be enforced when it is contained in an adhesion contract. See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 11, § 187, Comment b; Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Con-
flict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (1953). See also Davis v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 283
So. 2d 783 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 203.
49. Id. Comment e.
50. Id. Comment c.
51. Id. § 187(2)(b).
52. Id. § 187.
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reject some contacts as evasions of otherwise-applicable law. 53
In summary, under the Restatement, (i) to have a substantial relation-
ship to a contract, a state must have a normal and natural relationship to
the contract and the parties; (ii) such a relationship generally may not be
based solely upon contacts purposely located in a chosen jurisdiction in an
attempt to secure application of its law; and (iii) a substantial relationship
may exist with a jurisdiction that is either the state of the borrower's prin-
cipal place of business, the state of performance, or the state in which a
loan is actually made, if each state has a normal and natural relationship
to the contract. 54
Texas Rule. Under general Texas choice of law principles applicable in
usury cases, contracting parties may specify that the validity and enforce-
ability of an agreement and the rights and obligations of the parties there-
under, including the maximum interest rate, are to be governed by the law
of a particular jurisdiction. In such a case, the substantive local law of the
chosen jurisdiction 55 will be applied by Texas courts if the contract and the
transaction of which it is a part bear a reasonable relationship to that juris-
diction, provided: (i) neither such choice of law nor the reasonable rela-
tionship between the contract and the jurisdiction whose law is chosen
constitutes a subterfuge or contrivance to evade application of Texas law,56
and (ii) neither the choice of another jurisdiction's law nor maintenance of
an action based upon such law contravenes Texas public policy.57 This
rule is similar to the rule of many other jurisdictions. 58
In Securities Investment Co. v. Finance Acceptance Co. 59 a Missouri
lender advanced funds to a Texas borrower, secured by certain of the bor-
rower's receivables that were assigned to the lender. The loan agreement
between the parties provided that it was to be governed by Missouri law.
The borrower challenged the transaction as usurious on the basis of Texas
law. The trial court upheld the position of the borrower, applied Texas
53. See notes 80-117 infra and accompanying text.
54. RESTATMENT, supra note 11, § 203, Comment c.
55. As a general rule, the forum will apply its own law with respect to procedural issues.
See, e.g., California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 967
(1958).
56. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 90 Tex. 480, 39 S.W. 656 (1897); Hi Fashion Wigs
Profit Sharing Trust v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 579 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1979, no writ); Securities Inv. Co. v. Finance Acceptance Corp., 474 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ.
App-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
57. See, e.g., Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
922 (1955); Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967).
58. See, e.g., Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d
688, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971) (applying the rule in a non-usury case); Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert,
239 Ga. 675, 238 S.E.2d 368 (1977) (applying the rule in a non-usury case); Fidelity Sav.
Ass'n v. Shea, 6 Idaho 405, 55 P. 1022 (1899) (applying the rule in a usury case); Chalmers &
Williams v. Surprise, 70 Ind. App. 646, 123 N.E. 841 (1919) (applying the rule in a non-
usury case); Big Four Mills Ltd. v. Commercial Credit Co., 307 Ky. 612, 211 S.W.2d 831
(1948) (applying the rule in a usury case); Castleman v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 171 Miss.
291, 156 So. 648 (1934) (applying the rule in a usury case); Shotwell v. Dairymen's League
Coop. Ass'n, 22 N.J. Misc. 171, 37 A.2d 420 (1944) (applying the rule in a non-usury case).
59. 474 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
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law, and awarded damages based upon a violation of Texas usury stat-
utes.60 The court of civil appeals reversed, however, holding that "[w]here
the parties to a contract specify in the instrument that it is to be governed
by the law of a particular state, that law will apply if it has a reasonable
relationship to the contract," 6' but that the chosen law would not be ap-
plied "if it is established that the agreement was merely a contrivance to
evade the Texas usury statute."' 62 In the Securities Investment Co. case, a
reasonable relationship clearly existed between the contract and the state
of Missouri because the lender was a Missouri corporation and loan pro-
ceeds had been advanced in Missouri. An equally clear reasonable rela-
tionship existed with Texas, however, which the court failed to discuss.
The court also failed to address whether the choice of Missouri law was a
contrivance to evade Texas law, perhaps because the parties failed to de-
velop the issue.
Thus, Texas courts have analyzed the enforceability of an express choice
of law in the usury context by requiring a reasonable relationship to the
jurisdiction whose law is chosen. Yet the basis for a finding of the requi-
site relationship is seldom articulated. The bulk of the discussion in Texas
decisions focuses upon public policy and the doctrine of evasion.63 Even
so, Texas courts have also declined to analyze in detail either of these as-
pects of choice of law enforceability. The analysis that follows, by review-
ing authorities from Texas and other jurisdictions, examines the problems
involved in determining a reasonable relationship, an evasion of local law,
or a contravention of public policy and provides a basis upon which lend-
ers and their counsel may evaluate the enforceability of a contractual
choice of governing law when a transaction is challenged as usurious.
The Required Reasonable Relationship. Of the numerous Texas decisions
considering the issue, none appears to have focused upon the requirement
of a "reasonable relationship" or to have articulated the basis for the find-
ing of such a relationship between the transaction and the chosen jurisdic-
tion. Texas courts also have not fully analyzed the effect upon an express
choice of law when reasonable relationships concurrently exist between a
transaction and more than one jurisdiction. In those instances in which an
express choice of law has been upheld, Texas courts generally find the nec-
essary connection implicit if one of the parties to the contract resides in the
jurisdiction whose law is chosen.64
A representative Texas decision is Hi Fashion WTgs Profit Sharing Trust
v. Hamilton Investment Trust,65 in which a New Jersey lender had pro-
vided construction financing to two Oklahoma employee benefit trusts for
60. Id. at 264.
61. Id. at 271.
62. Id. at 272.
63. See notes 55-62 supra and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
65. 579 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
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the purpose of constructing an apartment project and an office building in
Texas. Each of the significant loan documents included a choice of the
"internal law" of the State of Oklahoma. The agreement pertaining to the
office building loan also included a choice of forum clause under which the
borrowers irrevocably consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Oklahoma. The agreements had been negotiated in Oklahoma and New
Jersey and the loan closing had occurred in New Jersey. All advances
were made in Oklahoma, and all payments of principal and interest were
made in New Jersey at the lender's office.
The two employee benefit trusts sued the lender in Texas, alleging that
the lender had contracted for, charged, and received usurious interest. 66
The lower court found, on the basis of the express choice of law, that
Oklahoma law was applicable.67 The Texas court of civil appeals af-
firmed,68 citing the general reasonable relationship rule and rejecting with-
out discussion the contention of the plaintiffs that the "State of Oklahoma
does not bear a reasonable relationship to the parties involved and the
transaction sued upon."' 69 While not specifically relying upon any particu-
lar contacts or group of contacts between the State of Oklahoma and the
transaction in question, the court noted that not only had the agreements
been negotiated in Oklahoma and the advances made there, but also both
the plaintiff borrowers and the persons who represented them in the nego-
tiation and execution of the loan documents were Oklahoma residents.
Furthermore, the persons representing the borrowers in these negotiations
were experienced in lending transactions and both were attorneys, and the
usury claim was being asserted affirmatively rather than as a defense to a
suit by the lender. For purposes of establishing the required reasonable
relationship, therefore, the court apparently relied upon the residence of
the borrowers in Oklahoma, the disbursements in Oklahoma, and the resi-
dence of the borrowers' representatives in Oklahoma.
Other Texas decisions implicitly finding a reasonable relationship in-
clude Southwest Park Outpatient Surgery, Ltd v. Chandler Leasing Divi-
sion.70  Southwest Park, a Texas partnership, had leased certain
equipment from Chandler Leasing Division. The lease agreement pro-
vided that Massachusetts law would apply to the "construction" of the
lease. 7' Chandler brought suit against Southwest Park and certain guaran-
tors, alleging a default in payments of monthly rentals. As one affirmative
defense, the defendants asserted that the purported lease constituted a con-
ditional sales agreement and that usurious interest had been charged. The
defense was rejected by the trial court. On appeal, the court simply held
66. The plaintiffs also sued for statutory penalties.
67. 579 S.W.2d at 301.
68. Id. at 303.
69. Id. at 302. The court's only discussion of the doctrine of evasion, discussedal notes
80-117 infra, was that the trial court found "the agreement... free from any taint of sham,
subterfuge, or coercion." Id.
70. 572 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
71. Id. at 55.
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that the trial court's rejection of the usury defense could "be sustained
upon the basis of an implied finding that the law of Massachusetts gov-
erned the transaction. 72 The court did not discuss the relationship be-
tween the contract and the State of Massachusetts; the only apparent
connection was that the plaintiff lender was a Massachusetts corporation.
No reference was made to the place of negotiation of the agreement, the
domicile or residence of the parties or to any other connecting factor. Un-
fortunately, a similar lack of sufficient analysis characterizes numerous
Texas cases.73
Another example is Walker v. Associates Financial Services Corp.74 in
which a Texas resident borrowed money by mail from an Indiana lender.
Their agreement provided that the transaction was to be governed by the
laws of Indiana. The Texas court of civil appeals held that Indiana law
applied because the borrower sought the loan from the finance company;
the transaction was conducted by mail; and the borrower's application was
accepted in Indiana, where the loan was made and the lender's office was
located.
Hi Fashion Wigs, Southwest Park, and Walker are representative of
modern Texas authority. No reported Texas decision involving an express
choice of law has held to be lacking a "reasonable relationship" between
the transaction and the jurisdiction whose law was chosen to govern the
transaction.75 Nevertheless, parties should be aware that courts in other
jurisdictions have applied a somewhat stricter interpretation of "reason-
able relationship," and accordingly have refused to enforce certain express
contractual stipulations of governing law. 76 Therefore, when an express
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Black v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 559 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [Ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
74. 588 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The borrower in
Walker had made "no claim of fraud or subterfuge," id. at 418, and the court did not discuss
the effect of Texas public policy. See notes 118-26 infra and accompanying text. Moreover,
the court failed to indicate which of the parties had initiated the allegedly usurious transac-
tion although this point conceivably could constitute a significant factor in a court's decision
in a case involving finance companies operating by mail.
75. See, e.g., Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246, 14 S.W. 1024 (1891); Black v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 559 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
76. For example, in Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (E.D. Pa. 1929),
aff'd, 43 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 897 (1931), a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion borrowed funds from a Delaware corporation whose principal office was in Maryland.
The parties' agreement specified that Delaware law would govern. The court held the stipu-
lation of governing law to be ineffective because Delaware had "no normal relation to the
transaction." 43 F.2d at 727. See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. D & L Constr. Co.,
353 F.2d 169, 172 (8th Cir. 1965) (finding a "lack of a logical basis" for application of a
particular jurisdiction's law), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Consolidated Jewelers, Inc. v.
Standard Fin. Corp., 325 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1963) (holding that under Kentucky law, in
addition to the reasonable relationship requirement, some "vital element" of the contract
must be associated with the jurisdiction whose law is chosen); George Foreman Assoc. v.
Foreman, 389 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (noting that a stipulation of applicable
law "may bind the parties inter se [but] it cannot.., force a court to apply [such] law under
circumstances where such application would otherwise be inappropriate"), ay'd, 517 F.2d
354 (9th Cir. 1975); MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Imperial Glass Co., 65 F.R.D. 624 (D. Nev.
1974) (applying the Restatement rule and refusing enforcement of a contractual choice of
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choice of governing law is made in an agreement potentially subject to
Texas interest rate limits, the transaction should be structured to have as
many contacts as possible with the jurisdiction whose law is chosen. The
transaction should be substantially negotiated in the jurisdiction whose
law is chosen, and the loan closing or other formalities of finalization
should take place in that state. In the case of a loan, funding and, if possi-
ble, repayment should occur in the chosen jurisdiction. The state whose
law is selected should be the domicile of a party, the principal place of
business of a party, or the situs of an office or other place of business of a
party.77 The location of security for a loan may also be of some impor-
tance, though in most cases it would appear to be largely fortuitous and
not indicative of those jurisdictions actually possessing an interest in the
transaction. 78 Texas cases illustrate that a few of the above contacts with
the chosen jurisdiction will suffice to establish the required reasonable re-
lationship. To remove any question as to the intent of the parties, how-
ever, an express choice of law, broadly drafted, should appear in each of
the important documents. A choice of forum clause selecting the jurisdic-
tion whose law is chosen as the exclusive forum for litigation will also
indicate the parties' intent and may provide an additional relevant con-
tact.
79
A voiding Subterfuge or Contrivance. The second element of the prevail-
ing Texas choice of law analysis is that neither the choice of law itself nor
the arrangement of contacts between a transaction and the jurisdiction
whose law is selected may constitute a subterfuge or contrivance to evade
governing law in view of materially greater interest of another state), rev'd on other grounds,
533 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 887 (1976).
77. On the basis of the decision in Southwest Park, 572 S.W.2d at 53, the domicile of the
lender would apparently provide sufficient connection with the transaction, even in the ab-
sence of other contacts, to validate an express choice of that jurisdiction's law.
78. But see Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N.W. 229 (1914).
79. An exclusive choice of forum clause may also have the effect of entirely removing
the issue of applicable law from the Texas courts. For example, assume a Texas lender
makes a loan to a foreign borrower having a place of business in New York. New York law
is chosen to govern and the courts of New York are selected as the exclusive forum for
litigation related to the loan. If the borrower later brought suit in Texas, the initial issue to
be determined would be the effectiveness of the choice of New York as an exclusive forum.
Under the authority of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), In-Flight
Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972), and Copperweld Steel
Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 347 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1972), a Texas court should
hold, subject to questions of reasonableness and availability of the chosen forum, that the
suit should proceed only in the courts of New York. The New York courts would then make
the necessary choice of law determination. Because a forum may be more likely to enforce a
choice of its own substantive law, the likelihood of enforcement of the choice of New York
law would seem increased in such a case. This technique could be used to avoid raising the
choice of law issue in a forum inhospitable to the choice of law or otherwise likely to refuse
to recognize the parties' choice. For discussion of choice of forum clauses, see, e.g., Far-
quharson, Choice of Forum Clauses-A Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law, 8 INT'L LAW.
83 (1974); Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection Clauses, 19 WAYNE L.
REV. 49 (1972); Note, The Enforcement of Forum Selection Provisions in International Com-
mercialAgreements. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L.
449 (1972).
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Texas usury laws. Texas courts generally have declined to analyze this
issue in depth. The evasion issue, however, would appear to merit even
more judicial scrutiny than the "reasonable relationship" issue because a
reasonable relationship may ordinarily be established through deliberate
arrangement of contacts between the transaction and the chosen jurisdic-
tion. The key issue, therefore, is whether a relationship so established, ei-
ther deliberately or through fortuitous contacts, will be upheld because it is
neither a subterfuge nor contrivance to evade Texas law.
Few Texas cases have expressly held that either an express choice of
law8° or the structuring of a transaction to induce a court's choice of appli-
cable law8 ' constitutes a subterfuge or contrivance to evade application of
Texas law, although the opinions of many courts in Texas mention this
issue.8 2 The majority of Texas decisions that address the evasion issue
concern situations involving no express choice of law. In some of these
cases Texas courts have held that certain contacts between the transaction
and one or more jurisdictions were spurious, merely a matter of form, or
not indicative of the true intention of the parties regarding the applicable
law. 83 Such contacts therefore would not form the basis of a choice of
applicable law by the court.84 When the courts consider an agreement
containing an express choice of law, however, they are particularly un-
likely to view the choice as a contrivance to evade usury limits, exhibiting
instead a traditional solicitude for freedom of contract. 85
A significant early Texas decision is Dugan v. Lewis. 86 In Dugan an
individual resident in Texas, acting through his agent in New York, bor-
rowed a sum of money from a British lender. The loan agreement had
been made in New York. The note was payable in New York and was
secured by a deed of trust on Texas land with the lender's New York agent
as trustee. Both the deed of trust and the note were delivered to the lender
in New York. The transaction also had contacts with Texas. Two addi-
tional notes to cover the expenses of the borrower's agent in procuring the
loan were executed and delivered in Texas and were payable to a Texas
resident. A choice of law provision in the deed of trust, referring to the
80. No Texas court has refused to uphold an express choice of governing law on the
basis that such choice constituted a subterfuge to evade application of Texas law.
81. See, e.g., Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 90 Tex. 480, 39 S.W. 656 (1897).
82. See, e.g., Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 77 F.2d 152, 156 (5th
Cir. 1935); Hi Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 579 S.W.2d 300,
302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ); Securities Inv. Co. v. Finance Acceptance
Corp., 474 S.W.2d 261, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.).
83. Texas courts initially will seek the true intention of the parties. If the parties' "true"
intention cannot be derived from the contract or the jurisdictions to which the transaction
somehow related, Texas courts will apply either the law of the place of contracting or the
law of the place of performance. See note 36 supra.
84. See, e.g., Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 90 Tex. 480, 39 S.W. 656 (1897); Grace
v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ refd
n.r.e.).
85. See, e.g., Hi Fashion Wigs Profit Sharing Trust v. Hamilton Inv. Trust, 579 S.W.2d
300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ); Securities Inv. Co. v. Finance Acceptance
Corp., 474 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).
86. 79 Tex. 246, 14 S.W. 1024 (1891).
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note and transaction in general, selected the law of Texas "where [the con-
tract] is made."' 87 The borrower brought an action to prevent enforcement
of the deed of trust, arguing that New York law was applicable and that
under New York law the transaction was usurious and, as a result, void.
The Texas Supreme Court held that Texas law was applicable, primarily
based upon a finding that the parties did not subjectively intend to violate
or evade either New York or English usury lawsA8 The court noted the
respective contacts between the transaction and the States of New York
and Texas, but did not analyze these contacts either in terms of a "reason-
able relationship" or otherwise. The court cited with approval decisions
that had relied upon the fact that parties acted in good faith in making a
contract subject to the laws of a jurisdiction where their transaction would
not be usurious. 89 The court also noted that while choice of law may not
be used to evade Texas usury laws, evasion was unlikely where the law of
the borrower's residence was chosen.90
In Building & Loan Association v. Gr!on,9 1 a typical Texas case involv-
ing no express choice of governing law, the Supreme Court of Texas ana-
lyzed the structuring of the transaction in somewhat greater detail than in
Dugan to determine whether it constituted a sham or contrivance to evade
Texas usury limits. In Gri/n a husband and wife residing in Texas bor-
rowed funds from a building and loan association situated in South Da-
kota. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on Texas property. The
lender imposed several additional charges in connection with the loan
which, although permissible in South Dakota, clearly rendered the trans-
action usurious under Texas law. The trial court and court of civil appeals
found the transaction to be usurious on that basis. 92 On appeal, the lender
argued that the lower courts had erred in not applying the law of South
Dakota to determine the applicable interest rate maximum, 93 basing its
argument upon the provision of the agreement that "expressed that the
money [the payments of the borrower] is to be paid in [South Dakota]. '94
In its examination of the issue, the Texas Supreme Court noted that the
lender had qualified to conduct business in Texas and "[ilt therefore be-
came domiciled in the State the same as an individual would." 95 Indeed,
the lender had been qualified to do business in Texas for ten years. The
borrower was domiciled in Texas and all of his property, some of which
87. Id.
88. Id. at 253, 14 S.W. at 1026.
89. Id. at 252-53, 14 S.W. at 1026.
90. Id.
91. 90 Tex. 480, 39 S.W. 656 (1897).
92. Id. at 483-84, 39 S.W. at 656-57.
93. Id. at 485, 39 S.W. at 657.
94. Id. at 482, 39 S.W. at 658. Under traditional Texas choice of law rules, when the
intention of the parties as to governing law is not expressed, the law of the place of con-
tracting will be applied or, if the place of performance was other than the place of con-
tracting, its law would be applicable. See note 36 supra. Thus, in Griffin, if the place of
performance were actually South Dakota, the laws of that state should have been applicable
to govern the maximum interest rate that could be charged.
95. 90 Tex. at 488, 39 S.W. at 659.
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secured the loan, was situated there. No enforcement of the contract was
likely in South Dakota. On the basis of these factors, the court looked to
the subjective intent of the parties and found no intent that the contract be
performed in South Dakota.96 Rather, the court found that the parties
actually intended the transaction to be performed in Texas and that the
lender's intent to evade Texas law was clear.97 The court held:
The fact that the contract expresses that the money borrowed is to be
paid in the territory of Dakota is met by the real substantial provi-
sions for its enforcement and the circumstances under which the busi-
ness was transacted with such overwhelming force that we are brought
to the conclusion that the contract, in so far as it provided by its terms
for the payment of the money in the territory of Dakota, was simply a
device to evade the laws of this state . . . . [F]rom the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case the intent to evade the laws of Texas is mani-
fest.98
The court in Grin quoted approvingly one commentator who suggested:
[Wihen a contract is made payable at a place other than the residence
of either of the parties, and foreign to the subject-matter of the con-
tract, and a higher rate of interest is stipulated for than the laws of a
place of contract permit, the parties will be presumed to have in-
tended a fraudulent invasion [sic] of those laws.99
Thus, if both the borrower and the lender are located in the jurisdiction in
which all substantial activities are to be carried out in connection with a
particular transaction, a Texas court will presume the intent to evade
Texas law where only minimal performance aspects of the transaction such
as payments by the borrower are to take place in another jurisdiction hav-
ing a higher permissible interest rate maximum. Presumably, Texas courts
would take the same position when the parties expressly select the law of
the other, marginally connected, jurisdiction to govern their transaction.
Several other Texas cases of the same period reached conclusions consis-
tent with Groin.1°° In Crenshaw v. Hedrick'0 a Louisiana corporation
qualified to do business in Texas made a loan to a Texas resident after
several years of engaging in business there. The debt was evidenced by a
note secured by a deed of trust on Texas real property owned by the bor-
rower. The borrower also made payments to the lender's branch office in
Texas. The bylaws of the lender provided that all monies were to be paya-
ble at the lender's principal office in New Orleans and "[a]ll contracts
made by or with the association shall be deemed to have been made at the
home office in New Orleans."' 0 2 Louisiana law precluded the borrower
96. Id. at 488-89, 39 S.W. at 659.
97. Id. at 489, 39 S.W. at 659.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting TYLER, USURY 83 [sic]).
100. See, e.g., Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Atkinson, 50 S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App.
1899, writ refd); People's Bldg., Loan & Sav. Ass'n v. Bessonette, 48 S.W. 52 (Tex. Civ. App.
1898, writ refd); Crenshaw v. Hedrick, 47 S.W. 71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ refd).
101. 47 S.W. 71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ refd).
102. Id. at 73.
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from raising the defense of usury because the borrower was a stockholder
of the lender.
The borrower brought suit in Texas after his default on the loan, alleg-
ing usury in an attempt to enjoin the sale of his land under the deed of
trust. The loan documents contained no choice of governing law. The
court of civil appeals held that the contract was of the same character as
the agreement held usurious in Groin.103 The contract was clearly in-
tended to be performed in Texas, not in Louisiana. As a result, the laws of
Texas governed with respect to the charge of usury because Texas was the
place of performance and the place of contracting, and, under Texas law,
the contract was usurious.
Similarly, in People's Building, Loan & Saving Association v. Bes-
sonette,' 4 in which a loan was made to Texas residents by a New York
lender, the court of civil appeals held the contract usurious under the prin-
ciples enunciated in Griffin. No choice of law provision was contained in
the loan documentation, but the lender argued that because the loan was
made payable in New York at the office of the lender, the laws of New
York, the place of performance, should govern. The court, however, re-
jected the argument on the basis of Griffin. 10 5
Due to the dearth of broadly applicable analysis in Dugan, Grffin, and
related cases, particular caution must be exercised before attempting to
extend these holdings beyond their own facts. On the basis of Dugan,
however, an express choice of governing law apparently will be enforced if
the law of the borrower's residence is selected, at least if other contacts
with such jurisdiction exist, because this law probably would not be se-
lected for purposes of evading Texas usury laws.' 06
Whether Grifn and similar cases limit the relatively broad holding of
Dugan is unclear. Undoubtedly, though, on the basis of Grin, the place-
ment or arrangement of any contact between a contract and a particular
jurisdiction purely as a matter of form will be considered evasive for
choice of law purposes when all other provisions of the contract and all
substantial aspects of the transaction relate to another jurisdiction. 107 Grf-
103. Id. at 75.
104. 48 S.W. 52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898, writ refd).
105. Id. at 53; accord, Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Atkinson, 50 S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1899, writ refd).
106. See Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (E.D. Pa. 1929), af/'d, 43 F.2d
730 (3d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 897 (1931).
107. In Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 77 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1935),
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a similar usury question in the context of a
bond issuance. The hotel company, a Texas corporation, issued certain corporate bonds to a
Louisiana bank and a Louisiana securities broker. To secure the bond issuance, the issuer
executed a deed of trust and bond indenture covering Texas property. The bonds were
payable in New Orleans. In litigation several years later after default by the issuer, the
issuer asserted that its obligations under the bonds were usurious and that the contacts be-
tween the transaction and Louisiana were "the result of a device to avoid Texas usury laws."
Id. at 155. The court held that the contacts were not merely a colorable device to evade
Texas law, but rather, that the "bonds were Louisiana contracts, made, issued, and to be
performed there." Id. at 156. The court distinguished Grifin on the following basis:
[Griffin] merely held under the facts of that case that a Texas court would
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fin suggests that the mere designation of a jurisdiction as the place where
payments are to be made under a loan agreement is an insufficient nexus
with such jurisdiction to induce a Texas court, at least in the absence of an
express choice of law, to apply the usury laws of that jurisdiction.
A choice of governing law woud seem particularly subject to attack as
an evasion of Texas law when the only contact between the contract and
the jurisdiction whose law is chosen is a relatively insubstantial one. Grif
fin and other Texas cases dealing with the issue appear to attribute the
most weight to those contacts arising from actual performance of a trans-
action, such as the place of disbursement of loan proceeds and the place of
repayment. Although some broad authority upholds a choice of law that is
ultimately purely nominal, in practice a contractual stipulation that selects
the law of a jurisdiction that is neither the domicile nor residence of any
party is likely to trigger judicial inquiry into the issue of evasion. The
courts of Texas, as well as those of other states, are particularly prone to
find an attempt to evade state usury laws when the legal interest rate maxi-
mum of the chosen jurisdiction is more permissive than that of the forum
state. Unless connected to a more substantial aspect of the transaction,
such as the residence of one of the parties, the place of disbursement of
loan proceeds, or the domicile of the indenture trustee in connection with a
bond issuance, the place of the agreement's execution may bear no particu-
lar relationship to the actual agreement between the parties or to the per-
formance of that agreement and, standing alone, might well be deemed an
insufficient basis for an express choice of law.'08 Similarly, the place of
negotiation of a loan or other transaction would seem insufficient alone to
overcome a charge that a selection of that jurisdiction's more permissive
local usury law constitutes an evasion of Texas law. Even when a loan was
both executed and negotiated in the same jurisdiction, a choice of that
jurisdiction's permissive usury laws could be questionable. i09 Moreover,
the location of collateral would appear, in itself, to be an insufficient con-
tact. 110
Conceivably, a selection of the law of a non-Texas lender's domicile
could withstand a charge of evasion if the lender does not do business in
Texas or have an office in Texas, even if the loan is to a Texas borrower.
In both Griffin and Crenshaw, the lender had an office in Texas through
reject as untrue, and as merely a part of an usurious device, the provision of
the contract that it was made and to be performed, not in Texas, but in an-
other state, when every fact and circumstance in the case showed that this was
not so. It does not purport to lay down as a general rule that good-faith con-
tracts for money which would be usurious under Texas laws if made and to be
performed there will, merely because they are secured by liens on Texas prop-
erty, be held invalid in suits in Texas courts, though valid in the state of the
making or of the performance of the contract. It is well settled that the general
rule in both state and federal courts is to the contrary of this.
Id.
108. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 188(2), Comment e.
109. See Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931).
110. But see Lanier v. Union Mortgage, Bank & Trust Co., 64 Ark. 39, 40 S.W. 466
(1897); Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa 194 (1867).
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which it conducted most of its operations in connection with the loan. The
selection of the law of its domicile, and contractual provisions making the
loans payable at the lender's domicile, were plainly efforts to evade more
restrictive Texas usury limits, If other aspects of a transaction took place
in, or were connected to, the state of a lender's domicile, a choice of its law
would appear valid."'I In the absence of such an additional connection,
however, courts in other jurisdictions have refused to apply the law of the
lender's domicile.' 12
A more difficult question arises regarding the extent to which Texas law
permits the deliberate arrangement of contacts without running afoul of
the evasion issue. If a New York lender making a loan to a Texas bor-
rower chooses New York law to govern the transaction and arranges nu-
merous contacts with New York, such as conducting negotiations, closing
the loan, disbursing funds, and scheduling payments in New York, the
transaction should not be susceptible to criticism because real and substan-
tial connections exist with the selected jurisdiction. Thus, New York law
legitimately could be selected to govern the transaction. If, on the other
hand, all of the transaction's contacts other than the domicile of the lender
were with Texas, a choice of New York law probably would be held to
constitute an evasion of Texas law.113 This outcome is probable despite
the fact that, with the possible exception of the parties' respective domi-
ciles, all of the contacts in both examples are reasonably within the control
of the parties. The basis upon which a Texas court might hold a transac-
tion to be an evasion of Texas law merely because such contacts are "ar-
ranged" with another state are not immediately apparent. Accordingly,
some question remains as to the ability of parties to such a transaction to
structure their contacts deliberately with usury limits in mind.
While no Texas case appears to have considered this issue explicitly, the
United State Supreme Court held in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse
Co. 1"4 that if the usury limits in force at the place of performance and the
place of contracting differ, the parties may choose the higher of the two
rates.' -5 The Court further explained:
A qualification of these rules, as sometimes stated, is that the parties
must act in good faith, and that the form of the transaction must not
"disguise its real character.". . . As thus stated, the qualification, if
taken too literally, would destroy the rules themselves for they obvi-
ously are to be invoked only to save the contract from the operation of
the usury laws of the one jurisdiction or the other. The effect of the
qualification is merely to prevent the evasion or avoidance at will of
the usury law otherwise applicable, by the parties' entering into the
contract or stipulating for its performance at a place which has no
normal relation to the transaction and to whose law they would not
I11. See Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N.W. 229 (1914).
112. See, e.g., United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Lanzarotti, 47 Idaho 287, 274 P. 630
(1929); Stoddard v. Thomas, 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 177 (1915).
113. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
114. 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
115. 1d. at 407.
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otherwise be subject. Wharton, in his Conflict of Laws, § 510 o, in
discussing this qualification, says: "Assuming that their real, bonafide
intention was to fix the situs of the contract at a certain place which
has a natural and vital connection with the transaction, the fact that
they were actuated in so doing by an intention to obtain a higher rate
of interest than is allowable by the situs of some of the other elements
of the transaction does not prevent the application of the law allowing
the higher rate.' 16
Thus, according to Seeman, parties to an agreement may legally arrange
their transaction so as to avoid otherwise potentially applicable usury stat-
utes, at least when the jurisdiction selected by them and with which they
arrange the contacts of their transaction has a "natural and vital" connec-
tion with the transaction." 1 7 At the same time, courts are likely to view
more favorably those arrangements that evidence the concurrence of both
the lender and the borrower rather than arrangements made solely by the
lender.
In addition, courts probably will look to the principal business activity
of the lender in making a determination as to evasive intent. If, for exam-
ple, the lender is domiciled in a state having a high interest rate ceiling, but
its principal or sole business activity consists of making mail-order loans to
persons in states with lower maximum interest rates, a court would no
doubt view the plight of the lender unsympathetically. The contrary
should be true if the lender's activity in a state with a lower usury ceiling
were sporadic.
Public Policy. Assuming that a court can establish that a transaction
bears a reasonable relationship to the jurisdiction whose law is chosen and
that the selection of such law does not constitute a subterfuge or contri-
vance to evade Texas law, it must still establish that Texas public policy is
not offended by the choice of law. A Texas court will not apply the law of
a foreign jurisdiction when to do so would violate the public policy of the
state of Texas." 18 As the court in Groifn indicated, the forum was not obli-
gated to enforce contracts that would be invalid under its laws and "which
116. Id. at 408.
117. See also Union Dime Sav. Inst. v. Wilmot, 94 N.Y. 221 (1883), wherein the New
York Court of Appeals analyzed a claim that a transaction had been structured as a contriv-
ance to evade otherwise applicable usury statutes. The court held:
There is no evidence whatever that the transaction took the form it did as a
cover for usury. In one sense it took this form for the purpose of escaping
usury. But the parties had a perfect right to deal with each other with the
usury laws before their eyes, and to so shape the transaction as to avoid the
condemnation of those laws. It is always the right of one having money to
loan or to invest to require, in order that he may obtain more than six per cent,
that securities . . . shall be presented to him before he will advance money
Id. at 227; accord, Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
118. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979); Castilleja v.
Carnero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967); Means v. Limpia Royalties, 115 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1938, writ dism'd); Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co., 252 S.W. 287




are so contrary to the laws of the state in which they are sought to be
enforced as to work an injury and injustice to the people of the [forum]
state or government, or a serious interference with its own policy or
laws." 119
In some jurisdictions, courts have seized upon this rule to strike down an
otherwise enforceable express choice of governing law. For example, in
O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,120 Washington residents, who
were customers of a New York stockbroker, had entered into margin con-
tracts with the broker. The contracts provided that New York law was
applicable thereto. The Supreme Court of Washington, however, held that
Washington usury laws should apply, though they rendered the transac-
tion usurious, primarily because of the "fundamental" policy of the State
of Washington against charging interest to Washington residents at a rate
greater than the maximum allowed by Washington law.' 21 Authorities
emphasize, however, that a choice of foreign law will only be disregarded
when it clearly violates a fundamental policy of the jurisdiction whose law
would otherwise be applicable. 22 The Restatement, for example, provides
that application of the chosen law may be refused where application of
that law "would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state . . . in the
determination of the particular issue" if the state would be the jurisdiction
whose law would be applicable in the absence of an effective choice of law
by the parties.' 23 Although the public policy rule has been similarly con-
strued in Texas in another context,' 24 no Texas cases involving an express
choice of law appear to have considered the public policy issue, and no
Texas decisions have held in a usury case that a choice of foreign law by a
Texas resident was violative of a fundamental policy of the State of Texas.
Yet the Grnin case, in which no express choice of law was made, suggests
in a dictum that structuring a transaction to render applicable another
state's more permissive maximum interest rate may be violative of Texas
public policy. 125
In summary, Texas decisions do not indicate whether a Texas court
would hold a choice of foreign law for usury purposes violative of Texas
public policy. Numerous Texas decisions, however, have approved the ap-
plication of the usury laws of other states even when the borrower resides
119. 90 Tex. at 490, 39 S.W. at 660.
120. 90 Wash. 2d 680, 586 P.2d 830 (1978), aff'd on rehearing, 93 Wash. 2d 51, 605 P.2d
779 (1980).
121. 586 P.2d at 833. See also DeKorwin v. First Nat'l Bank, 318 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963).
122. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 187. See also Bundy v. Commercial
Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860, 864 (1931) (the mere fact that a loan is made to a
North Carolina resident by a resident of another state at a rate of interest in excess of that
permitted in North Carolina does not "necessarily offend the public policy of this state").
123. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 187(2)(b).
124. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Titus, 41 F. Supp. 171, 173 (S.D.
Tex. 1941) ("Generally those cases holding foreign contracts void, because violative of pub-
lic policy in the state of the forum, have dealt with things positively prohibited by law, or
violative of public morals or destructive of its settled policy.").
125. 90 Tex. at 490, 39 S.W. at 660.
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in Texas. 126 A judicial invalidation of a choice of foreign law seems par-
ticularly unlikely when the Texas borrower in question is reasonably so-
phisticated and possesses bargaining power roughly equivalent to that of
the lender. Moreover, when the only Texas resident involved in a transac-
tion is a lender, a "public policy" invalidation of a contract, valid under
the usury laws of the borrower's residence or under the choice of law prin-
ciples of the borrower's state of residence, would seem at odds with the
basic policy underlying usury limits: protection of necessitous borrowers.
The Rule of Validation. While no Texas court appears explicitly to have so
held, many authorities, 127 including the Restatement, 128 indicate that in the
area of usury a distinct set of principles may exist affecting choice of law
rules.129 These authorities have suggested that judicial decisions com-
monly evidence a desire to uphold a contract despite a charge of usury
when the contract or transaction bears a reasonable relationship to any
jurisdiction under whose law the contract may be upheld. This approach
is particularly evident when the interest rate actually charged is only
slightly greater than the interest rate permitted under the law of the state
that would declare the transaction usurious. 30
II. USURY AND CHOICE OF LAW UNDER SECTION 85 OF THE
NATIONAL BANK ACT
The maximum rate of interest that may legally be charged, collected, or
received by a national bank is governed by section 85 of the National Bank
126. See, e.g., Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 77 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.
1935); Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Southwest Park Outpatient Surgery, Ltd. v. Chandler Leasing Div., 572
S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, no writ).
127. See, e.g., H. GOODRICH, supra note 18, at 216-19; R. LEFLAR, supra note 43, at 312-
14; Comment, supra note 6, at 124, and authorities cited therein.
128. RESTATEMENT, supra note I1, § 203.
129. The decision generally cited as forming the basis of this rule is Seeman v. Philadel-
phia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927). In Seeman a transaction that had contacts with
both Pennsylvania and New York would have been usurious in New York although it was
legal in Pennsylvania. In a suit on the contract, the issue of usury was asserted on the basis
of New York law. The United States Supreme Court, in upholding the contract, first noted
the well-established rule of Andrews v. Pond, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 65 (1839), that if a contract is
made in one jurisdiction and performable in another, the parties may apply the higher usury
ceiling of the place of performance. The Court then noted:
In support of a policy of upholding contractual obligations assumed in good
faith, this Court has adopted the converse of the rule . . . [of Andrews v.
Pond]. "If the rate of interest be higher at the place of the contract than at the
place of performance the parties may lawfully contract in that case also for the
higher rate." . . .
A qualification of these rules, as sometimes stated, is that the parties must
act in good faith, and that the form of the transaction must not "disguise its
real character." . . . As thus stated, the qualification, if taken too literally,
would destroy the rules themselves, for they obviously are to be invoked only
to save the contract from the operation of the usury laws of the one jurisdic-
tion or the other.
274 U.S. at 407-08 (citations omitted); see text accompanying notes 114-17.
130. See H. GOODRICH, supra note 18, at 216.
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Act, 13' and to the extent incorporated through section 85, by state law.
Section 85 reads in part:
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan
or discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evi-
dences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State,
Territory, or District where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per
centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper
in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district
where the bank is located, or in the case of business or agricultural
loans in the amount of $25,000 or more, at a rate of 5 per centum in
excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at
the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve district where the
bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and no more, except
that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks
organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for
associations organized or existing in any such State under this chap-
ter. 132
National banks are thus allowed to collect interest at the greater of the rate
provided by the "laws" of the state in which the bank is "located"' 133 or a
rate calculated on the basis of the appropriate federal discount rate.
Section 85 and its predecessors 134 have been interpreted for over a hun-
dred years to give national banks advantages equal to those enjoyed by
state banks under state law. Numerous judicial decisions analyzing section
85 have reasoned that the section is enabling rather than restraining.135
National banks are, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, the
131. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976). Although the Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, was originally
entitled "An Act to Provide a National Currency .... " its title was altered by Congress in
1874 to the "National Bank Act." Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 343, 18 Stat. 123.
132. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976) (emphasis added).
133. A national bank is located at the place where it maintains its principal place of
business and where its operations of discount and deposit are performed. Marquette Nat'l
Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 538
F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977). A national bank's location
must be specified on the bank's organizational certificate. 12 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). A bank
may also be located at the site of its authorized branches. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bou-
gas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977).
134. Section 85 was enacted in its original form as § 30 of the National Bank Act of 1864,
ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108.
135. Daggs v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 177 U.S. 549 (1900) (purpose of statute was to place
national banks on equal footing with state banks); Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 862 (1874) (statute was intended to give national banks advantages equal to state
banks); First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975) (purpose of statute was to
put national banks in position to compete with state banks); Brown v. First Nat'l City Bank,
503 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1974) (section 85 was intended solely to place national banks on equal
footing with state banks); Hiatt v. San Francisco Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 504 (9th Cir.) (com-
petitive opportunities of national banks should not be thwarted by limitations on interest
rates more restrictive than those applicable to state banks), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 948 (1966).
See also Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978) (national banks on equal
footing with state banks), a~fdsub nom. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 48 U.S.L.W.
4279 (1980); Ray v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 443 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1978)
(application of "most favored lender" doctrine); Monongahela Appliance Co. v. Community
Bank & Trust, N.A., 393 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D.W. Va. 1975), aff'dmem., 532 F.2d 751 (4th
Cir. 1976) (purpose of National Bank Act is to put national and state banks on equal foot-
ing).
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"national favorites."' 36 In creating a system of national banks, Congress
did not intend to expose these national banks to unfair competition from
state banks or to allow the states to discriminate unfairly against them by
legislation. 137
Section 85 seeks to achieve this goal of equality between state and na-
tional banks by providing that national banks located in a particular state
may charge or receive interest on their loans at the rate permitted by state
law for similarly situated state banks. Thus, if a state's interest rate maxi-
mum is eighteen percent, national banks located in that state are permitted
to charge or receive interest at the rate of eighteen percent. An interpretive
dilemma arises, however, with respect to the intended scope of the phrase
"laws of the state . . . where the bank is located" in section 85. In light of
the fact that the purpose of section 85 was to establish competitive equality
between state and national banks, a reasonable interpretation of the above
phrase would include a state's choice of law rules within the scope of "laws
of the state." This reading would allow national banks the same latitude
enjoyed by state banks in those states in which parties to state bank trans-
actions may choose to apply the higher usury ceiling of another state hav-
ing the requisite contacts. If, however, the phrase is interpreted to refer
only to such state's substantive usury laws, the opposite result would ob-
tain. Under this second construction, national banks would be subject to
serious discrimination, because, unlike state banks, they would be unable
to apply, through choice of law, another state's higher usury limits.
The discriminatory impact of a narrow interpretation of section 85 may
be avoided if the reference to the laws of the state of a national bank's
location is interpreted to include not only the substantive usury laws of
such state, but also its choice of law principles. This interpretation would
allow national banks the same limited flexibility accorded to state banks in
making an effective choice of law. Although no reported cases have ex-
pressly addressed the question of whether section 85 encompasses a state's
choice of law rules, dicta in several opinions would support such an inter-
pretation. In Daggs v. Phoenix National Bank 3 8 the United States
Supreme Court held that "[t]he intention of the national law is to adopt the
state law, and permit to national banks what the state law allows to its
citizens and to the banks organized by it."' 139 In First National Bank v.
Nowlin ' 40 the Eighth Circuit held, without reference to choice of law prin-
ciples, that section 85 incorporates state interpretations of the proper
method for calculating the legal rate of interest and not merely the maxi-
mum numerical rate of interest specified by state law. 141 The court further
136. Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 862, 864 (1873).
137. Id.
138. 177 U.S. 549 (1900).
139. Id. at 555.
140. 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975).
141. Id. at 876. But see Evans v. National Bank, 251 U.S. 108 (1919); Northway Lanes v.
Hackley Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972); Ray v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 443 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), which held that § 85 incorporates
state law only to the extent of establishing the maximum numerical rate while federal law
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indicated that section 85 adopts the entire case law of a state.142
Several other recent decisions involving multistate transactions may be
read to support an interpretation of section 85 that would encompass state
choice of law rules. In Meadow Brook National Bank v. Recdle 43 a Louisi-
ana district court held that the laws of a state other than the state of a
national bank's location governed as to the applicable interest rate in an
interstate loan. Thus the court in Meadow Brook found that a loan made
by a New York national bank to a Louisiana borrower was not governed
by New York's usury laws but by Louisiana's. In order to reach this result,
the court first determined that because the lender was located in New
York, New York's substantive usury law would govern interest rates if sec-
tion 85 were applicable to the transaction. 44 Yet application of New York
law would, according to the court, subvert the purpose of section 85, which
was to place national banks on an equal footing with state banks. 45 This
purpose would be thwarted in the opinion of the court because consistent
application of the usury law of the state where a national bank was located
would unfairly benefit banks located in states with high usury limits and
penalize national banks located in states with low usury ceilings. 46 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that section 85 does not fix the rate of interest
chargeable on interstate loans and applies only to "loans made in the state
where the bank is located."'147
Aside from the difficulty inherent in determining where a loan is
"made," the Meadow Brook decision ignores the plain wording of section
85, which clearly calls for application of the law of the state where the
national bank is located. The Meadow Brook court could have avoided
application of New York usury law by looking to the whole law of New
York, including its choice of law rules. Had the court applied Ntw York
governs as to whether such rate may be charged by discount or through annual percentage
rates. The cited cases may, however, be distinguished from Nowlin and Daggs because the
former primarily discussed the issue of whether the taking of interest in advance, and
thereby increasing the lender's effective yield, amounted to usury when such practice would
cause a specific loan to be usurious under state law. Because § 85 specifically provides that
national banks may collect interest in advance, the courts in Evans, Northway, and Ray
rightly determined that the issue before them was governed by federal law and not state law.
The same holding does not, according to the Nowlin court, apply to all issues concerning the
determination of how interest is to be measured. 509 F.2d at 879.
142. 509 F.2d at 876. The application of a state's entire statutory and case law may be
significant apart from the difference that may exist between states with respect to numerical
usury limits. For instance, a number of jurisdictions prohibit the assertion of the defense of
usury by a corporation. See note 5 supra.
143. 302 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. La. 1969).
144. Id. at 72. The court failed to recognize that application of New York law could
include not only New York substantive law, but its choice of law principles as well.
145. Id. at 74; see note 137 supra and accompanying text.
146. 302 F. Supp. at 74. The same argument was made by the plaintiff in Marquette
Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), discussed at notes 152-57
infra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court held, however, that the development of a
national banking system was the paramount concern of Congress in enacting the National
Bank Act and that a certain amount of discrimination even between national banks located
in different states was inherent in such a system.
147. 302 F. Supp. at 75.
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choice of law rules, it could reasonably have found that under such rules
Louisiana's substantive usury law would control. The court could have
thus reached the result it desired and remained consistent with section 85.
Another case that lends support to the argument that national banks
should have access to their state's choice of law principles is Fisher v. First
National Bank.148 The issue presented in Fisher was whether a national
bank located in Illinois could, under section 85, charge interest to an Iowa
borrower based upon Illinois usury ceilings. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals first held that because the bank was located in Illinois, section 85
allowed the application of Illinois usury limits to loans made by such bank
regardless of the location of the borrower. Without discussing the applica-
tion of choice of law principles under section 85, the court then turned its
attention to construing the "except clause" at the end of the first sentence
of section 85. This clause states: "[E]xcept that where by the laws of any
State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the
rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in
any such State under this chapter."' 149 The court determined that if a na-
tional bank were located in Illinois, but "existed" in Iowa, the bank could,
with respect to a loan made in Iowa, charge interest based upon either
Iowa or Illinois usury law. The court declined, however, to expand upon
what constitutes "existing" in a state. 150 Clearly, though, because the na-
tional bank in this case was undeniably located in Illinois, the term "ex-
isting" must refer to something other than being physically located in a
state. Arguably then, under section 85, a national bank exists in a state
whenever it makes loans in such state and when it exists in a state, it
should be permitted to charge interest at the rate permitted by the laws of
that state.15i
The Seventh Circuit unfortunately failed to explain in Fisher how to
determine when a loan is made in a certain jurisdiction for purposes of
determining where a bank exists under section 85. Consider, for example,
the case of a loan made by a Texas national bank to a Delaware corpora-
tion having its principal place of business in New York. The loan is se-
cured by property owned by the corporation and located in Idaho.
148. 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
149. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976) (emphasis added). When the United States Supreme Court
decided Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S (18 Wall.) 862 (1873), the "except clause" only
referred to "associations organized in any such state." The addition of the words "or ex-
isting" may be an indication that Congress envisioned national banks making loans in a
foreign state and being governed by such foreign state's usury laws, without actually being
located there.
150. In Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), dis-
cussed at notes 152-57 infra and accompanying text, the Court, while determining where
Omaha Bank was located, declared that it would not seek to determine the meaning of the
phrase "organized or existing in any such state" or its relationship to the term "located."
439 U.S. at 308-09 n.19.
151. Without extensive analysis the Eighth Circuit, in Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 548
F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977), followed the Seventh Circuit's Fisher opinion and held that if a
national bank located in one state makes a loan in another state, the bank may charge inter-
est at the highest rate in effect in either state.
19801
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Negotiations for the loan are held at the corporation's offices in New York.
The documents are signed by the corporation's chief executive officer at his
home in New Jersey. Payments on the loan are to be made in Texas.
Without reference to choice of law principles, no consistent method exists
for determining where the loan was made and thus which jurisdiction's
laws apply.
In Marquette National Bank P. First of Omaha Service Corp. 152 the
United States Supreme Court addressed a fact situation similar to that in
Fisher.153 Marquette involved a national bank in Nebraska, where the in-
terest rate ceiling was eighteen percent,' 54 that issued credit cards to per-
sons in Minnesota, where the maximum interest rate was set at twelve
percent.' 55 Another national bank situated in Minnesota filed suit to en-
join the operation of the credit card program, insofar as it involved the
issuance of credit cards to Minnesota residents, claiming that First Na-
tional Bank of Omaha, by virtue of its lending to Minnesota borrowers,
was located in Minnesota and therefore subject to Minnesota usury laws.
The defendant answered that no usury was involved because, under sec-
tion 85, it had the ability to make loans, even to Minnesota residents, at the
interest rate permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where it was lo-
cated, that is Nebraska.
The issue thus presented was whether a national bank's location, for
purposes of section 85, should be stationary and based upon its physical
situs, or flexible and dependent upon a given transaction's contacts with a
specific jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that to establish a national
bank's location by reference to a series of contacts would introduce confu-
sion into the already complex system of modern banking. According to
the Court, if a national bank's location varied, a bank could never be cer-
tain whether it had a sufficient nexus with another jurisdiction so as to
alter its location and thus open the way to the application of that jurisdic-
tion's usury laws. Accordingly, the Court held that a national bank's loca-
tion for purposes of section 85 was at its situs.156
The plaintiff in Marquette also argued that the exportation of interest
rates from one state to another would hinder the capability of states to
enact and enforce usury laws. In enacting the National Bank Act, Con-
gress, according to the plaintiff, envisaged only "local" national banks
making intrastate loans and not national banks making loans of an inter-
state character. If the system of the national banks were truly interstate,
and thereby allowed a national bank to charge interest on loans, wherever
made, at a rate permitted in the jurisdiction where it was physically situ-
152. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
153. 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
154. Interest on unpaid balances on credit card accounts may be charged at a rate of 18%
per annum on the first $1000 and 12% on the balance over $1000. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-
815-8-823, 8-825-8-829 (1974).
155. Interest rates on Minnesota card holder accounts are limited to 12%. MINN. STAT.
§ 48.185 (1979).
156. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 312-13 (1978).
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ated, national banks located in states with low usury ceilings would be
discriminated against because they would be limited by their state's low
ceilings while national banks located in other states could make loans at
the higher rates permitted by the jurisdiction of such location.
Rejecting these arguments, the Supreme Court recognized that the ap-
plication of section 85 to interstate transactions might adversely affect local
banks, including national banks making intrastate loans, but nevertheless
held that Congress's paramount intention in enacting the National Bank
Act was to create an interstate banking network and that the Act should
apply to interstate loans.' 57 The Court further noted that the impairment
of state usury laws was inherent in the establishment of a national banking
system. 158
In analyzing the holding of the Supreme Court in Marquette, one must
keep in mind both the particular facts of the case and the Court's assess-
ment that one of Congress's primary objectives in enacting the National
Bank Act was to create an interstate banking system. Under the facts of
Marquette, the plaintiff, by encouraging an elastic interpretation of the
word "location," was attempting to limit the ability of national banks to
make interstate loans. If the Court had accepted the plaintiff's arguments
and held that a national bank's location was variable depending on where
and to whom it made loans, it would have discouraged banks in states with
high usury ceilings from making loans to borrowers in states with low ceil-
ings because such banks would be forced to make the loans under the
more restrictive usury laws of the state with the low ceiling. That result
would have thwarted the evolution and growth of the interstate banking
system. On the other hand, in determining that a national bank's location
is static and based upon situs, the Court rendered an opinion that, upon
the facts, encourages the growth of the interstate banking system. Follow-
ing Marquette, a national bank, at the very minimum, may charge interest
on interstate loans based upon the usury ceiling of the state of its location.
Arguably, the uncertainties involved in determining a bank's location by
reference to a series of contacts, which the Marquette Court declined to
inject into the federal banking laws, is comparable to the problems existing
when choice of law is considered in the application of section 85. To be
sure, however, any difficulties inherent in applying choice of law principles
to national banks are not of a different character than those presently con-
fronted by state chartered lenders making interstate loans.
If state chartered lenders are able to deal with uncertain choice of law
principles, no reason exists to support the belief that national banks and
their counsel are any less capable. The next logical step after Marquette is
to interpret section 85 to encompass the choice of law rules of the state
where the national bank is physically situated and thus to further en-
courage interstate banking. The incorporation of choice of law principles
would ensure that national banks could not only charge interest at the rate
157. Id. at 318.
158. Id. at 314.
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permitted by the substantive usury laws of the state of their location but, in
addition, would have the option, assuming an effective choice of law provi-
sion in the loan documents and a reasonable relation between the loan and
another jurisdiction, of choosing such other jurisdiction's usury limits to
govern the transaction. Such an interpretation clearly would be consistent
with the Supreme Court's expressed intent in Marquette to interpret sec-
tion 85 broadly to encourage the growth of interstate banking.
Furthermore, if the National Bank Act is to be broadly construed to
facilitate and expand the interstate banking system without regard to the
effect on local usury laws and to allow a national bank physically located
in a jurisdiction with a high interest ceiling to make loans in states with
low interest ceilings, a national bank located in a state with a low interest
ceiling should be allowed, through use of an express choice of law provi-
sion in the relevant loan documents, to make loans in a state with a high
ceiling if the transaction has a reasonable relation to that state. Otherwise,
only national banks located in states with high usury limits are benefited
by the interstate character of our national banking system. National
banks, such as Marquette National Bank, located in states with low usury
ceilings, such as Minnesota, could suffer unreasonable discrimination and
in times of tight money would be unable to make loans to anyone, even
out-of-state borrowers, at the current market rate.' 59
Finally, permitting a national bank located in a jurisdiction with a low
maximum interest rate to make loans to a borrower situated in a state with
a higher maximum interest rate does not offend any legitimate public pol-
icy of either state related to the transaction. A state with a low ceiling is
concerned primarily with protecting its residents from paying excessive in-
terest. Its scope of legislative authority does not extend to residents of
other states, who elect their own legislatures to decide upon an appropriate
interest ceiling. Similarly, a state with a relatively high statutory usury
limit has already made the policy determination to allow its citizens to
borrow funds pursuant to its stated interest ceiling. A state with high inter-
est ceilings should thus be unconcerned that its residents pay interest at the
legal maximum to out-of-state lenders.' 60
No reported decisions to-date have construed section 85 to encompass
choice of law rules.' 6 1 In Marquette the Supreme Court held that the law
of the state where the bank is located governs usury limits applicable to
159. The prime rate was at a record 20% on April 4, 1980. Wall St. J., April 4, 1980, at i,
col. 2. Thus, in April 1980, Minnesota lenders were required either to lend funds below the
market rate or place loans out of state.
160. For an introduction to relevant governmental interest analysis, see R. LEFLAR,
supra note 43, § 92.
161. But see Letter No. 116, Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letters, [1979] FED. BANKING
L. REP. (CCH) 85,191, in which the Comptroller of the Currency issued a letter ruling on
the issue of whether a national bank located in a state with a low usury ceiling could make
loans pursuant to the usury laws of another jurisdiction having a higher usury rate. Based
upon an analysis of choice of law principles and the holdings of the Seventh Circuit in
Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977),
and the Eighth Circuit in Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1977), which
were both based upon the "except clause" in § 85, the Comptroller reasoned that a national
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such bank. This rule standing alone, however, would hinder development
of our interstate banking system because of the penalty it places upon na-
tional banks located in states with low usury limits. The Court did not
address the question of whether the "laws of the state" where a bank is
located includes such state's choice of law principles; thus, that interpreta-
tion could be made without overruling Marquette. In Fisher the Seventh
Circuit determined that a national bank had a choice of applying the law
of the state where it was located or the law of the state where the loan was
made. Problems arise with this opinion because in many interstate trans-
actions, absent use of choice of law principles, the place where a loan is
"made" is indeterminable. Finally, the court in Meadow Brook only
reached its decision to apply the substantive law of a jurisdiction other
than that of the bank's location by a contorted reading of the statute.
These courts failed to reach a decision that would in all cases be consis-
tent with a careful analysis of section 85 and the policies that underlie its
enactment. Attainment of a reasonable result in consonance with the
objectives of section 85 can be realized through an interpretation that re-
fers to the choice of law principles in effect in the state where a lending
bank is located.
III. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, an express choice of law and
careful structuring of a transaction should, in most circumstances, render
applicable to a transaction the usury laws of the state chosen by the parties.
In Texas no judicial decision involving express choice of law has failed to
enforce such a choice of law in the usury context.
The impact of the National Bank Act in a multi-jurisdictional situation
is less certain. A national bank in a state with high interest rate maximums
may make loans under the National Bank Act at rates allowed by the laws
of such bank's location to borrowers domiciled in states having lower in-
terest rate maximums. The argument of the authors, however, that na-
tional banks should be permitted to utilize the choice of law rules of the
state of their location in determining applicable interest rate maximums
has yet to be tested in the courts. Accordingly, situations are certain to
arise involving loans by national banks in which the applicable interest
rate maximum is open to question. National banks should be permitted to
utilize the choice of law rules of their respective jurisdictions in making a
determination as to applicable usury law, much as they select the law ap-
plicable to other aspects of their lending transactions. Whether this result
will actually be reached under the National Bank Act is an issue that must
await review in the courts.
bank is not bound by the usury ceiling of the state of its location when making loans to out-
of-state borrowers.
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